Credit rating agencies play a powerful and contentious role in the governance of global financial markets. Introducing an original framework for delegating political authority to private actors, this book explains common trends in the regulatory use of private ratings for public purposes and analyzes regulatory changes after the Financial Crisis.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
This article analyzes the empowerment and disempowerment of credit rating agencies (CRAs) as private regulatory intermediaries. Until the recent financial crisis, regulators heavily relied on private credit ratings to impose risk-sensitive requirements on financial market actors (targets). Regulatory use of credit ratings was instrumental in empowering CRAs because regulatory authority was delegated to them and their own private power was bolstered by public endorsement. But regulators' subsequent efforts to disempower the CRAs—more recently regarded as dysfunctional "runaway" intermediaries—have proven costly, complicated to do, and hardly consequential in limiting CRAs' de facto power. This dynamic reveals a path-dependent power shift in favor of private intermediaries that is more pronounced (1) the larger the intermediary's own sources of power when an RIT arrangement is established, (2) the larger the transfer of authority to the intermediary, and (3) the longer regulators rely on the intermediary.
In: Journal of international relations and development: JIRD, official journal of the Central and East European International Studies Association, Band 17, Heft 1, S. [112]-141
This article points out that dynamics of private authority over time and de-privatization processes are analytically and practically crucial, but so far under-researched aspects of private authority and privatization. It argues that more scholarly attention should be paid to these phenomena and advocates a state-focused, but dynamic theoretical approach which takes seriously the empirical possibility that states may play an asymmetric role in the authorization (i.e. privatization) and dis-empowerment (i.e. de-privatization) of private governance actors. For that purpose, it proposes a fruitful and constructive combination (rather than rivalry) of theoretical literatures such as principal-agent theory, political economy research on private authority and historical institutionalism. Adapted from the source document.
This article seeks to systematise and advance the theoretical debate on the causes and conditions for the privatisation of security. Drawing on previous research on private military and security companies (PMSCs) and theories from International Relations and Comparative Politics, it reconstructs functionalist, political-instrumentalist and ideationist explanations for why and under what conditions even 'strong' and democratic Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development states (extensively) use PMSCs. An analysis of inter-temporal and cross-national (United States, British, German and French) patterns of security privatisation indicates that all the three theoretical models point out causes and conditions that are relevant for a comprehensive explanation, but none is sufficient alone. Therefore, the article uses both the models and the empirical evidence to propose a synthetic perspective, which treats different explanatory conditions and logics as complementary, rather than rival. Going beyond the atheoretical conclusion that a multitude of disconnected factors are in some way relevant for a comprehensive explanation of security privatisation, I develop a thin and a thick synthesis that rely on a domain-of-application approach and sequencing, respectively. The thin synthesis spells out how different explanatory factors operate in specific domains, whereas the thick synthesis elaborates how different conditions and mechanisms apply to different phases of security privatisation and how they interrelate. Adapted from the source document.
This volume provides researchers and students with a discussion of a broad range of methods and their practical application to the study of non-state actors in international security. All researchers face the same challenge, not only must they identify a suitable method for analysing their research question, they must also apply it. This volume prepares students and scholars for the key challenges they confront when using social-science methods in their own research. To bridge the gap between knowing methods and actually employing them, the book not only introduces a broad range of interpretive and explanatory methods, it also discusses their practical application. Contributors reflect on how they have used methods, or combinations of methods, such as narrative analysis, interviews, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), case studies, experiments or participant observation in their own research on non-state actors in international security. Moreover, experts on the relevant methods discuss these applications as well as the merits and limitations of the various methods in use. Research on non-state actors in international security provides ample challenges and opportunities to probe different methodological approaches. It is thus particularly instructive for students and scholars seeking insights on how to best use particular methods for their research projects in International Relations (IR), security studies and neighbouring disciplines. It also offers an innovative laboratory for developing new research techniques and engaging in unconventional combinations of methods. This book will be of much interest to students of non-state security actors such as private military and security companies, research methods, security studies and International Relations in general.
AbstractAs powers such as China and India rise, and powers such as the US or the UK decline, international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund come under pressure to adapt to new power realities. In the wake of global power shifts, both emerging and established powers may challenge the institutional status quo. Contrary to what most power transition and power shift theories assume, challengers do not always draw on power bargaining to pursue institutional adjustment. In some issue areas, they do, but in others they employ alternative strategies including strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion. In order to contribute to a better understanding of institutional adjustments to global power shifts, the introduction to this special issue theorizes these various strategies. First, we conceptualize power bargaining, strategic cooptation, rhetorical coercion and principled persuasion as distinct strategies for institutional adjustment. Second, we elaborate on the conditions under which challengers choose particular strategies. Third, we specify the conditions under which challengers are able to achieve institutional adaptation through a particular strategy. Finally, we discuss broader implications for the future of the international order and the management of global power shifts.
AbstractAs emerging powers rise and established powers decline, international institutions come under pressure to adjust to new power realities. When and how do international institutions adapt to underlying global power shifts? We propose an (institutionalist) theory of strategic co-optation that differs from both (realist) accommodationist and (liberal) integrationist theories. Drawing on isolated treatments of strategic co-optation from other domains – domestic and international, autocratic and democratic, past and present – we develop a theory of strategic co-optation as a mode of institutional adaption to shifts in the global distribution of power. The theory specifies the concept, the conditions and the (unintended) consequences of strategic co-optation. We conceptualize co-optation as a specific form of adaptation where established powers trade institutional privileges for emerging powers' institutional support. We theorize the conditions under which emerging and established powers are (more or less) likely to strike a co-optation deal. In addition, we identify endogenous dynamics that may render co-optation precarious and thus subject to instabilities. While the ambition of this paper is primarily theoretical, we provide various empirical illustrations of how strategic co-optation is used to adapt international institutions to contemporary shifts in the global distribution of power.